Now, Macron’s most urgent priorities remain at home, where he must find a way to reconcile the antagonisms that currently divide France into multiple and overlapping binary oppositions: privileged vs. disadvantaged, insider vs.marginalized, urban vs. rural, educated vs. non-degreed, globalist vs.sovereignist. And he must do so in the context of a still-mutating and uncertain party system, and amid widespread popular dissatisfaction with both the institutions and outcomes of mainstream political processe.
Professor Mehri Madarshahi
Former Senior Economist of the United Nations
Member of the Advisory Committee of ICCSD
Visiting Professor of South China University of Technology, Visiting Professors at Guangzhou Foreign Studies University and Jinan University. President oh Global Cultural Networks
The French voted for what the world was longing for: stability andmoderation; advancing the European Green Revolution; and peaceful coexistence with those who did not share the same point of view. Macron’s re-election is a welcome result for France, the EU, the western alliance and is pivotal for the cause ofliberal democracy worldwide.
The opinion piece by the German, Spanish, and Portuguese leaders,published in Le Monde on 21April 2022, was unprecedented. Stating “the choice French people are facing iscrucial for France and for all of us in Europe,” they laid out how the trajectory of France is intertwined with their own countries, as all of themare EU (and NATO) members. Given that France is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and a founding member of NATO and the EU, none of its partners is indifferent to the result of the election.His victory also came as a relief to investors and NATO alliance in the midst of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
France, however, remains deeply divided.Macron’s second five-year termpromises to be even harder than his first, with the angry resistance to his domestic reforms, the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.In his second term, he needs to complete his unfinished campaign promises in reshaping France’s pension systems, raising retirement age to 65, shrinking the public sectorand other pledges which were left unattended to during the first five years of his presidency. None of these issues will be easy to tackle, given rising inflation, supply chain disruptions and other pressures resulting from the pandemic and the continuous conflicts and instability in Ukraine. Accordingly, it is of extreme importance for Macron to maintain a majority in the upcoming elections for the National Assembly.The two-round elections will take place on June 12 and 19.Macron’s tasks will be especially for midable by the social and political divisions that were laid bare in France’s presidential campaign. Almost three in five voters chose candidates ofthe radical right or left in the election’s first round, and abstention in the second round, at 28 per cent of the electorate, reached its highest level since 1969,although preventing to some extent formation of a right-wing “allianceor axis in Europe”.
While it is not unprecedented for a French president to rule with alegislative minority and a prime minister from a different political conviction, such “cohabitation” tends to produce frictions between competing personalities and branches of government and diluting the effectiveness of policymaking.
The opposition (formed out of many fractured parties) voted for chose candidates of the radical right or left in the election’s first round who supported a different Europe, and a different France and ultimately a different world in which tunnel visions of race and identity were predominantly figured in their slogan and campaign promises. They wanted France to pull out of NATO, out of EU and sever its relations with the United States which according to them was the main motto behind the present conflict in Ukraine resulting in energy and food shortages and leading to rampant inflation and high debt for Europe and in particular forFrance.
After their defeat in the second round, the propaganda machines of the opposition are now repackaging their archaic racist massages with the objective ofattracting those who cared more about their pocketbooks than France as one of the pillar of stability in the turbulent ocean of continental Europe. In that light, Marie Le Pen vowed to continue fighting for the deprived segment of French society by maintaining the pension age at 60 and to with draw from NATO as well as re-establishing relations with Russia. She wants with her “Rassemblement National Party” to win in June adequate parliamentary delegations to the National Assembly to become eligible for the Prime Ministership. The same desire isshared by Melanchon, the leader of the ultra-left party who won third place in the first round of the elections. Such results of the legislative electionscould leave the re-elected president with his wings clipped.
Brussels greeted the news of Macron’s reelection(by a wide margin),with a deep sigh of relief. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen sent outa note of congratulations almost immediately. But if a far-left or far-right majority in parliament were to come to pass it could lead to gridlock in the EU’s law making process.Thevery likely scenario is the majority would be made up of the center-left andcenter-right—and thus unlikely to be in extreme opposition to Macron’s EUpolicies.
Le Pen is a known provocatory right wing in French politics for the pastcouple of decades.Her share of the vote was the highest of any anti-establishment candidate since the Fifth Republic’s birth in 1958. She received her strongest supportfrom voters between the ages of 25 and 59. On the far-left, candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon wanted to quit NATO outright, saying that itproduced nothing but squabbles and instability. A NATO-skeptic President Melenchon might have been of concern especially for Poland, which hasa 1,160-kilometer border with territory now controlled by Russia. Melenchon who came in third just barely behind Marine Le Pen in the election’s first round, called on voters to make him the next Prime Minister of France.
Le Pen was damaged by her incoherent economic proposals,her pro-Russian sympathies and the well-founded perception of millions of voters that she was more extreme on matters such as immigration than her newly crafted image of patriotic good sense as it is suggested In her renewed campaign.
She deliberately spread fabricating information about Macron asserting that Macron solely is to be blamed for hiking the costs of living, oil and gas prices, increase immigration and hike in pensionable services from 62 to 65. By appealing to rural and the departements outre mer, she labels him as representative of elites not in touch with the proletariat and unaware of the pain that the French bread winners are enduring to make their livings. The campaign of misinformation and alternative facts through social media spreads among those in public who saw themselves as the center of universe with the tunnel vision caringonly about their immediate welfare. The sad fact is they represent some 35 per cent of all French. Their acquired strength is unprecedented and alarming to the European Union. Yet Macron owed his victory partly to the weaknesses of Le Pen and her superficially attractive but misguided and even dangerous plans.
It is notable that with the exception of Jacques Chirac who was re-elected in 2002, Macron is the only French President of the Fifth Republic who has won asecond term and he did so with a comfortable margin. Despite this, his critics are comparing his scores to that of the 2017 election and consider it a defeat for his politics, for hispolicies and for the arrogance with which he was accused to have ruled aspresident. Shouldn’t they remember, however, his accomplishments during the first term as president by reducing unemployment,passing well-designed pro-business measures and giving France a more dynamicand constructive role in the EU affairs.
Macron sailed France through a few troubled years while he was in office during the course of which the recurring and violent riots of the yellow vest proved to be a major headache for him and the country. Protesters were originally people from rural areas who drive long distances as part of their daily life. They said they couldn’t afford the hike in fuel prices. Protests appeared in pockets around France to denounce Macron’s green tax and then quickly grew into a largermovement that included members of the working and middleclasses who are expressing their frustration about slipping standards of living. They said their incomes were too high to qualify for social welfare benefits but too low to make ends meet. Violent protests erupted over several weekends in Paris, where rioters defaced the Arc de Triomphe and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, looted shops, vandalized buildings and even attacked police. French authorities note that most of the violence and vandalism were incited by anarchists known as “casseurs”.
These riots with all their destructions and costs to public were not the only problems the Macron administration faced. The Anti-COVID policy movements brought to the streets of France a different cause by a different segment of the population.The strikes by transportation and railroad unions lasted several months impeding the free flow of traffic, while at the same time the streets of Paris witnessed huge demonstrations against pension reforms as proposed by the Government. As part of his environmental policy strategy, Emmanuel Macron announced a green tax on fuel last year to go into effect as of 1 January. The move set off nearly a month of protests around France. The Imposed tax on fuels, the cost of living and finally the conflict in Ukraine and its economic pains for the average French were only the most notable among all other crisis he faced during his first term in office. While Macron could be considered the cause for some of this unrest, the impact of solidarity among the global far right and wide-spread populist movements in Europe and America fanned by foreign elements could be blamed for most others.
The defeat of Le Pen, followed by the election loss of Prime MinisterJanez Jansa in Slovenia, has further reduced the room for maneuver of anilliberal European axis already undermined by the Russian-led invasionin Ukraineright at the EU’s borders. The two defeated protagonists had both been strongly supported by the Hungarian Prime Minister,Viktor Orban, who however retained his iron grip in parliamentary elections in early April. As a result, he now may be isolated within the “Visegrad group,” formed with Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Macron’s election could reshape France’s post-war identity and indicate whether European populism is ascendancy or in decline. While the warin Ukraine is still raging, and France still holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU until June, the reelected president has a challenge to find the balance between the demanding international/European agenda and the more domestic concerns expressed by French citizens.
Despite all, everything has come together to make him the main leader of the European Union, says Gilles Paris,’Le Monde’ columnist.Emmanuel Macron istreading on a minefield in France, given the strength of the protest vote and the divergent motivations of the voters who helped him win,the experience gained during his first term aswell as the vision of a better future, which was advanced long ago.
The desire of creating a European superpower may look distant, but circumstances are combining to give Macron his best ever shot to push forward the vision. During his first term in office, Macron was frequently overshadowed by Angela Merkel. But Merkel has now retired as German chancellor. Macron, with the enhanced prestige that comesfrom re-election, will look to provide the ideas and dynamism for the EU.
Macron would almost certainly want to build up a joint European response to Ukraine and head off Russian threats. As the most powerful politician in Europe, over the next five years, he could try to transform not just France but Europe. If he succeeds, his presidency may lead to the emergence of Europe as a major geopolitical power, on a par with China and the US. The war in Ukraine has prompted Macron totry and infuse the alliance with a renewed sense of purpose.Macron really wants to create a European pillar of NATO. He is a great believer of a strong European defense system and on his watch, France’s defense spending has risen by €7 billion euros ($7.6 billion) with a target to raise it to 2 percentof gross domestic product.
The war in Ukraine has also been a lightning rod for him to underline the erosion of security in Europe. He pledged tolobby for an increase in defence spending across Europe,above all in Germany. That higher military spending is what Macron has long argued for. The strong possibility that Donald Trumpmay return to the White House in 2024 means that Macron’s arguments for greater European self-reliance have to be taken seriously. Many Europeans shudder at the thought of how a Trump-led America might handle Russia. Macron’s vision for France and his vision for Europe have always been inseparable. After both his presidential election victories, on Sunday night and in 2017, when he laid out the foundations for astrengthened European construction in a speech at the Sorbonne addressing directly the German chancellor Angela Merkel. The latter, who was then playing the role of European metronome due to her longevity at the head of the EU’s economic giant, never really responded.
According to Benjamin Haddad, European director of the influential Atlantic Council think tank, “this is the opening of anunprecedented window of opportunity.” “Not only are French ideas for Europeans to think in terms of strength and the balance of power in military and energy security domains a repetition of history, but they can also benefit from the transformation underway in Germany.
Incontrast with his sometimes tense relationships with the leaders of alliednations, Macron launched a failed charm offensive intended to build ties with Vladimir Putin in Russia. In the years before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,France pushed a unilateral and unsuccessful attempt at a rapprochement with Moscow. Macron’s efforts to keep lines open to Putin — before and after the invasion of Ukraine — however, have been met with scorn and suspicion by some in central Europe.
The French President’s relations with allies outside the EU have also been spiky. In 2021, France withdrew its ambassadors from the US and Australia (very briefly) after the secret signature of the Aukus security pact, which involved the loss of a major French armsdeal. In London, Macron is perceived as the EU leader most hostile to Britain. Despite the bitter U.S.-France short agitation last year— which saw France humiliated — PresidentJoe Biden and Macron are now on solid terms.
The Franco-Italian cooperation will have to be furtherenriched in order to preventively smoothen the inevitable political ups and downs. The cooperation treaty signed with Mario Draghi in 2021 is a good illustration. It was achieved after years of difficult negotiations due to majorities that were out of sync at the time,notably when then populist deputy prime minister Luigi Di Maio went to meetmembers of the Yellow Vests movement in France, who symbolically demanded their president’s head.
Relations have also been strengthened with Greece, in 2020, aswell as with Romania, and in both cases this has been at the military level.Two other European socialist leaders, the Antonio Costa of Portugal and Pedro Sanchez of Spain, have joined their German counterpartin publicappeals to urge French voters to keep Le Pen’seuroskepticism at bay at the ballot box.
Admittedly, the return of the United States to Europe, effectively illustrated on 26 April by the gathering of allied defense ministers at the US Air Force base in Ramstein, western Germany,may weaken the case for such a European sovereignty, which is notantagonistic but complementary to the transatlantic alliance.
The Trumpian precedent and the fear of its possible recurrence as soon as the American mid-term elections in November 2022, without even waiting for the now very uncertain US presidential elections of 2024, is an important reminder to Europeans that American guarantees could possibly be reversed in the future.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that France’s vision of European defense integration has historically generated suspicion and unease in Washington because of the fear that it would compete with NATO, but also in Europe where it was perceived as a way for France to leverage European capabilities in the service of its own strategic priorities. That is particularly the case in Eastern Europe, where threat perceptions have historically come from the eastand Russia, rather than the south and Africa, as in Paris.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the central role played by an engaged US to marshal the European military and economic responseto it, has now underscored the continued relevance of NATO and the trans-Atlantic alliance.
Now, Macron’s most urgent priorities remain at home, where he must find a way to reconcile the antagonisms that currently divide France into multiple and overlapping binary oppositions: privileged vs. disadvantaged, insider vs.marginalized, urban vs. rural, educated vs. non-degreed, globalist vs.sovereignist. And he must do so in the context of a still-mutating and uncertain party system, and amid widespread popular dissatisfaction with both the institutions and outcomes of mainstream political processe.
At the moment, he faces a second term filled with enormous challenges forFrance and Europe, from managing the post-pandemic economic recovery to responding to the threat posed by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s revisionism. Macron’s margin for maneuver seems limited by political realities at home and in Europe.